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E-mail addresses: alberto.piatti@idsia.ch (A. PiattIn this paper, we consider the coherent theory of (epistemic) uncertainty of Walley, in
which beliefs are represented through sets of probability distributions, and we focus on
the problem of modeling prior ignorance about a categorical random variable. In this set-
ting, it is a known result that a state of prior ignorance is not compatible with learning. To
overcome this problem, another state of beliefs, called near-ignorance, has been proposed.
Near-ignorance resembles ignorance very closely, by satisfying some principles that can
arguably be regarded as necessary in a state of ignorance, and allows learning to take place.
What this paper does, is to provide new and substantial evidence that also near-ignorance
cannot be really regarded as a way out of the problem of starting statistical inference in
conditions of very weak beliefs. The key to this result is focusing on a setting characterized
by a variable of interest that is latent. We argue that such a setting is by far the most com-
mon case in practice, and we provide, for the case of categorical latent variables (and gen-
eral manifest variables) a condition that, if satisﬁed, prevents learning to take place under
prior near-ignorance. This condition is shown to be easily satisﬁed even in the most com-
mon statistical problems. We regard these results as a strong form of evidence against the
possibility to adopt a condition of prior near-ignorance in real statistical problems.
 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Epistemic theories of statistics are often confronted with the question of prior ignorance. Prior ignorance means that a
subject, who is about to perform a statistical analysis, is missing substantial beliefs about the underlying data-generating
process. Yet, the subject would like to exploit the available sample to draw some statistical conclusion, i.e., the subject would
like to use the data to learn, moving away from the initial condition of ignorance. This situation is very important as it is
often desirable to start a statistical analysis with weak assumptions about the problem of interest, thus trying to implement
an objective-minded approach to statistics.
A fundamental question is whether prior ignorance is compatible with learning or not. Walley gives a negative answer for
the case of his self-consistent (or coherent) theory of statistics based on the modeling of beliefs through sets of probability
distributions. He shows, in a very general sense, that vacuous prior beliefs, i.e., beliefs that a priori are maximally imprecise,
lead to vacuous posterior beliefs, irrespective of the type and amount of observed data [11, Section 7.3.7]. At the same time,
he proposes focusing on a slightly different state of beliefs, called near-ignorance, that does enable learning to take place [11,
Section 4.6.9]. Loosely speaking, near-ignorant beliefs are beliefs that are vacuous for a proper subset of the functions of the. All rights reserved.
i), zaffalon@idsia.ch (M. Zaffalon), fabio.trojani@unisg.ch (F. Trojani), marcus@hutter1.net (M. Hutter).
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express vacuous beliefs for some functions of interest, and at the same time it maintains the possibility to learn from data.
The fact that learning is possible under prior near-ignorance is shown, for instance, in the special case of the imprecise Dirich-
let model (IDM) [12,1]. This is a popular model, based on a near-ignorance set of priors, used in the case of inference from
categorical data generated by a multinomial process.
Our aim in this paper is to investigate whether near-ignorance can be really regarded as a possible way out of the problem
of starting statistical inference in conditions of very weak beliefs. We carry out this investigation in a setting made of cat-
egorical data generated by a multinomial process, like in the IDM, but we consider near-ignorance sets of priors in general,
not only that used in the IDM.
The interest in this investigation is motivated by the fact that near-ignorance sets of priors appear to play a crucially
important role in the question of modeling prior ignorance about a categorical random variable. The key point is that
near-ignorance sets of priors can be made to satisfy two principles: the symmetry and the embedding principles. The ﬁrst
is well known and is equivalent to Laplace’s indifference principle; the second states, loosely speaking, that if we are ignorant
a priori, our prior beliefs on an event of interest should not depend on the space of possibilities in which the event is embed-
ded (see Section 3 for a discussion about these two principles). Walley [11], and later de Cooman and Miranda [3], have ar-
gued extensively on the necessity of both the symmetry and the embedding principles in order to characterize a condition of
ignorance about a categorical random variable. This implies, if we agree that the symmetry and the embedding principles are
necessary for ignorance, that near-ignorance sets of priors should be regarded as an especially important avenue for a subject
who wishes to learn starting in a condition of ignorance.
Our investigation starts by focusing on a setting where the categorical variable X under consideration is latent. This means
that we cannot observe the realizations of X, so that we can learn about it only by means of another, not necessarily cate-
gorical, variable S, related to X through a known conditional probability distribution PðSjXÞ. Variable S is assumed to beman-
ifest, in the sense that its realizations can be observed (see Section 2). The intuition behind the setup considered, made of X
and S, is that in many real cases it is not possible to directly observe the value of a random variable in which we are inter-
ested, for instance when this variable represents a patient’s health and we are observing the result of a diagnostic test. In
these cases, we need to use a manifest variable (the medical test) in order to obtain information about the original latent
variable (the patient’s health). In this paper, we regard the passage from the latent to the manifest variable as made by a
process that we call the observational process.1
Using the introduced setup, we give a condition in Section 4, related to the likelihood function, that is shown to be suf-
ﬁcient to prevent learning about X under prior near-ignorance. The condition is very general as it is developed for any set of
priors that models near-ignorance (thus including the case of the IDM), and for very general kinds of probabilistic relations
between X and S. We show then, by simple examples, that such a condition is easily satisﬁed, even in the most elementary
and common statistical problems.
In order to fully appreciate this result, it is important to realize that latent variables are ubiquitous in problems of uncer-
tainty. The key point here is that the scope of observational processes greatly extends if we consider that even when we di-
rectly obtain the value of a variable of interest, what we actually obtain is the observation of the value rather than the value
itself. Doing this distinction makes sense because in practice an observational process is usually imperfect, i.e., there is very
often (it could be argued that there is always) a positive probability of confounding the realized value of Xwith another pos-
sible value committing thus an observation error.
Of course, if the probability of an observation error is very small and we consider one of the common Bayesian model
proposed to learn under prior ignorance, then there is little difference between the results provided by a latent variable mod-
el modeling correctly the observational process, and the results provided by a model where the observations are assumed to
be perfect. For this reason, the observational process is often neglected in practice and the distinction between the latent
variable and the manifest one is not enforced.
But, on the other hand, if we consider sets of probability distributions to model our prior beliefs, instead of a single prob-
ability distribution, and in particular if we consider near-ignorance sets of priors, then there can be an extreme difference
between a latent variable model and a model where the observations are considered to be perfect, so that learning may
be impossible in the ﬁrst model and possible in the second. As a consequence, when dealing with sets of probability distri-
butions, neglecting the observational process may be no longer justiﬁed even if the probability of observation error is tiny.
This is shown in a deﬁnite sense in Example 9 of Section 4.3, where we analyze the relevance of our results for the special
case of the IDM. From the proofs in this paper, it follows that this kind of behavior is mainly determined by the presence, in
the near-ignorance set of priors, of extreme, almost-deterministic, distributions. And the question is that these problematic
distributions, which are usually not considered when dealing with Bayesian models with a single prior, cannot be ruled out
without dropping near-ignorance.
These considerations highlight the quite general applicability of the present results and raise hence serious doubts about
the possibility to adopt a condition of prior near-ignorance in real, as opposed to idealized, applications of statistics. As a
consequence, it may make sense to consider re-focusing the research about this subject on developing models of very weak1 Elsewhere, this is also called the measurement process.
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metry and the embedding principles can be realistically met in practice.2. Categorical latent variables
In this paper, we follow the general deﬁnition of latent andmanifest variables given by Skrondal and Rabe-Hasketh [10]: a
latent variable is a random variable whose realizations are unobservable (hidden), while a manifest variable is a random var-
iable whose realizations can be directly observed.
The concept of latent variable is central in many sciences, like for example psychology and medicine. Skrondal and Rabe-
Hasketh list several ﬁelds of application and several phenomena that can be modelled using latent variables, and conclude
that latent variable modeling ‘‘pervades modern mainstream statistics,” although ‘‘this omni-presence of latent variables is com-
monly not recognized, perhaps because latent variables are given different names in the different literatures, such as random ef-
fects, common factors and latent classes,” or hidden variables.
But what are latent variables in practice? According to Boorsbom et al. [2], there may be different interpretations of latent
variables. A latent variable can be regarded, for example, as an unobservable random variable that exists independently of
the observation. An example is the unobservable health status of a patient that is subject to a medical test. Another possi-
bility is to regard a latent variable as a product of the human mind, a construct that does not exist independently of the
observation. For example the unobservable state of the economy, often used in economic models. In this paper, we assume
the existence of a latent categorical random variable X, with outcomes in X ¼ fx1; . . . ; xkg and unknown chances
# 2 H :¼ f# ¼ ð#1; . . . ; #kÞ j
Pk
i¼1#i ¼ 1; 0 6 #i 6 1g, without stressing any particular interpretation. Throughout the paper,
we denote by # a particular vector of chances in H and by h a random variable on H.
Now, let us focus on a bounded real-valued function f deﬁned on H, where # 2 H are the unknown chances of X. We aim
at learning the value f ð#Þ using n realizations of the variable X. Because the variable X is latent and therefore unobservable by
deﬁnition, the only way to learn f ð#Þ is to observe the realizations of some manifest variable S related, through known prob-
abilities PðSjXÞ, to the (unobservable) realizations of X. An example of known probabilistic relationship between latent and
manifest variables is the following.
Example 1. Consider a binary medical diagnostic test used to assess the health status of a patient with respect to a given
disease. The accuracy of a diagnostic test2 is determined by two probabilities: the sensitivity of a test is the probability of
obtaining a positive result if the patient is diseased; the speciﬁcity is the probability of obtaining a negative result if the patient is
healthy. Medical tests are assumed to be imperfect indicators of the unobservable true disease status of the patient. Therefore,
we assume that the probability of obtaining a positive result when the patient is healthy, respectively of obtaining a negative
result if the patient is diseased, are nonzero. Suppose, to make things simpler, that the sensitivity and the speciﬁcity of the test
are known. In this example, the unobservable health status of the patient can be considered as a binary latent variable X with
values in the set {Healthy, Ill}, while the result of the test can be considered as a binary manifest variable Swith values in the set
{Negative result, Positive result}. Because the sensitivity and the speciﬁcity of the test are known, we know PðSjXÞ. 
We continue discussion about this example later on, in the light of our results, in Example 4 of Section 4.3. Near-ignorance sets of priors
Consider a categorical random variable X with outcomes in X ¼ fx1; . . . ; xkg and unknown chances # 2 H. Suppose that
we have no relevant prior information about # and we are therefore in a situation of prior ignorance about X. How should
we model our prior beliefs in order to reﬂect the initial lack of knowledge?
Let us give a brief overview of this topic in the case of coherent models of uncertainty, such as Bayesian probability theory
and Walley’s theory of coherent lower previsions.
In the traditional Bayesian setting, prior beliefs are modelled using a single prior probability distribution. The problem of
deﬁning a standard prior probability distribution modeling a situation of prior ignorance, a so-called non-informative prior,
has been an important research topic in the last two centuries3 and, despite the numerous contributions, it remains an open
research issue, as illustrated by Kass andWassermann [6]. See also Hutter [5] for recent developments and complementary con-
siderations. There are many principles and properties that are desirable when the focus is on modeling a situation of prior igno-
rance, and that have indeed been used in past research to deﬁne non-informative priors. For example Laplace’s symmetry or
indifference principle has suggested, in case of ﬁnite possibility spaces, the use of the uniform distribution. Other principles, like
for example the principle of invariance under group transformations, the maximum entropy principle, the conjugate priors princi-
ple, etc., have suggested the use of other non-informative priors, in particular for continuous possibility spaces, satisfying one or
more of these principles. But, in general, it has proven to be difﬁcult to deﬁne a standard non-informative prior satisfying, at the
same time, all the desirable principles.2 For further details about the modeling of diagnostic accuracy with latent variables see Yang and Becker [14].
3 Starting from the work of Laplace at the beginning of the 19th century [8].
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satisﬁed to model a situation of prior ignorance: the symmetry and the embedding principles. The symmetry principle states
that, if we are ignorant a priori about #, then we have no reason to favour one possible outcome of X over another, and there-
fore our probability model on X should be symmetric. This principle is equivalent to Laplace’s symmetry or indifference prin-
ciple. The embedding principle states that, for each possible event A, the probability assigned to A should not depend on the
possibility space X in which A is embedded. In particular, the probability assigned a priori to the event A should be invariant
with respect to reﬁnements and coarsenings of X.
It is easy to show that the embedding principle is not satisﬁed by the uniform distribution. How should we model our
prior ignorance in order to satisfy these two principles? Walley4 gives what we believe to be a compelling answer to this ques-
tion: he proves that the only coherent probability model on X consistent with the two principles is the vacuous probability model,
i.e., the model that assigns, for each non-trivial event A, lower probability PðAÞ ¼ 0 and upper probability PðAÞ ¼ 1. Clearly, the
vacuous probability model cannot be expressed using a single probability distribution. It follows then, if we agree that the sym-
metry and the embedding principles are characteristics of prior ignorance, that we need imprecise probabilities to model such a
state of beliefs.5 Unfortunately, it is easy to show that updating the vacuous probability model on X produces only vacuous pos-
terior probabilities. Therefore, the vacuous probability model alone is not a viable way to address our initial problem. Walley
suggests, as an alternative, the use of near-ignorance sets of priors.6
A near-ignorance set of priors is a probability model on the chances h of X, modeling a very weak state of knowledge about
h. In practice, a near-ignorance set of priors is a large closed convex setM0 of prior probability densities on hwhich produces
vacuous expectations for various but not all functions f on H, i.e., such that Eðf Þ ¼ inf#2Hf ð#Þ and Eðf Þ ¼ sup#2Hf ð#Þ.
The key point here is that near-ignorance sets of priors can be designed so as to satisfy both the symmetry and the
embedding principles. In fact, if a near-ignorance set of priors produces vacuous expectations for all the functions
f ð#Þ ¼ #i for each i 2 f1; . . . ; kg, then, because a priori PðX ¼ xiÞ ¼ EðhiÞ, the near-ignorance set of priors implies the vacuous
probability model on X and satisﬁes therefore both the symmetry and the embedding principle, thus delivering a satisfactory
model of prior near-ignorance.7 Updating a near-ignorance prior consists in updating all the probability densities inM0 using
Bayes’ rule. Since the beliefs on h are not vacuous, this makes it possible to calculate non-vacuous posterior probabilities for X.
A good example of near-ignorance set of priors is the setM0 used in the imprecise Dirichlet model. The IDM models a sit-
uation of prior near-ignorance about a categorical random variable X. The near-ignorance set of priorsM0 used in the IDM
consists of the set of all Dirichlet densities8 pð#Þ ¼ dirs;tð#Þ for a ﬁxed s > 0 and all t 2T, where4 In W
5 For
6 Wa
order to
7 We
Note 4.
8 Thrdirs;tð#Þ :¼ CðsÞQk
i¼1CðstiÞ
Yk
i¼1
#
sti1
i ; ð1ÞandT :¼ t ¼ ðt1; . . . ; tkÞ j
Xk
j¼1
tk ¼ 1; 0 < tj < 1
( )
: ð2ÞThe particular choice of M0 in the IDM implies vacuous prior expectations for all the functions f ð#Þ ¼ #Ri , for all integers
RP 1 and all i 2 f1; . . . ; kg, i.e., EðhRi Þ ¼ 0 and EðhRi Þ ¼ 1. Choosing R ¼ 1, we have, a priori,PðX ¼ xiÞ ¼ EðhiÞ ¼ 0; PðX ¼ xiÞ ¼ EðhiÞ ¼ 1:
It follows that the particular near-ignorance set of priorsM0 used in the IDM implies a priori the vacuous probability model
on X and, therefore, satisﬁes both the symmetry and embedding principles. On the other hand, the particular set of priors
used in the IDM does not imply vacuous prior expectations for all the functions f ð#Þ. For example, vacuous expectations
for the functions f ð#Þ ¼ #i  #j for i–j would be Eð#i  #jÞ ¼ 0 and Eð#i  #jÞ ¼ 0:25, but in the IDM we have a priori
Eð#i  #jÞ < 0:25 and the prior expectations are therefore not vacuous. In Walley [12], it is shown that the IDM produces,
for each observed dataset, non-vacuous posterior probabilities for X.
4. Limits of learning under prior near-ignorance
Consider a sequence of independent and identically distributed (IID) categorical latent variables ðXiÞi2N with outcomes in
X and unknown chances h, and a sequence of independent manifest variables ðSiÞi2N, which we allow to be deﬁned either on
ﬁnite or inﬁnite spaces. We assume that a realization of the manifest variable Si can be observed only after a (hidden) real-
ization of the latent variable Xi. Furthermore, we assume Si to be independent of the chances h of Xi conditional on Xi, i.e.,alley [11], Note 7 at p. 526. See also Section 5.5 of the same book.
a complementary point of view, see Hutter [5].
lley calls a set of probability distributions modeling near-ignorance a near-ignorance prior. In this paper we use the term near-ignorance set of priors in
avoid confusion with the precise Bayesian case.
call this state near-ignorance because, although we are completely ignorant a priori about X, we are not completely ignorant about h [11] Section 5.3,
oughout the paper, if no confusion is possible, we denote the outcome h ¼ # by #. For example, we denote pðh ¼ #Þ by pð#Þ.
9 We
continu
10 The
11 In t
arbitrar
Theorem
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for each xj 2 X and # 2 H.9 These assumptions model a two-step process where the variable Si is used to convey information
about the realized value of Xi for each i, independently of the chances of Xi. The (in)dependence structure can be depicted graph-
ically as follows:
where the framed part of this structure is what we call an observational process.
To make things simpler, we assume the probability distribution PðSijXi ¼ xjÞ to be precise and known for each xj 2 X and
each i 2 N.
We divide the discussion about the limits of learning under prior near-ignorance in three subsections. In Section 4.1 we
discuss our general parametric problem and we obtain a condition that, if satisﬁed, prevents learning to take place. In Section
4.2 we study the consequences of our theoretical results in the particular case of predictive probabilities. Finally, in Section
4.3, we focus on the particular near-ignorance set of priors used in the IDM and we obtain necessary and sufﬁcient conditions
for learning with categorical manifest variables.
4.1. General parametric inference
We focus on a very general problem of parametric inference. Suppose that we observe a dataset s of realizations of the
manifest variables S1; . . . ; Sn related to the (unobservable) dataset x 2 Xn of realizations of the variables X1; . . . ;Xn. Deﬁning
the random variables X :¼ ðX1; . . . ;XnÞ and S :¼ ðS1; . . . ; SnÞ, we have S ¼ s and X ¼ x. To simplify notation, when no confusion
can arise, we denote in the rest of the paper S ¼ s with s. Given a bounded function f ð#Þ, our aim is to calculate Eðf jsÞ and
Eðf jsÞ starting from a condition of ignorance about f, i.e., using a near ignorance priorM0, such that Eðf Þ ¼ fmin :¼ inf#2Hf ð#Þ
and Eðf Þ ¼ fmax :¼ sup#2Hf ð#Þ.
Is it really possible to learn something about the function f, starting from a condition of prior near-ignorance and having
observed a dataset s? The following theorem shows that, very often, this is not the case. In particular, Corollary 3 shows that
there is a condition that, if satisﬁed, prevents learning to take place.
Theorem 2. Let s be given. Consider a bounded continuous function f deﬁned onH and a near-ignorance set of priorsM0. Then the
following statements hold.10
(1) If the likelihood function Pðsj#Þ is strictly positive11 in each point in which f reaches its maximum value fmax, is continuous in
an arbitrary small neighborhood of those points, andM0 is such that a priori Eðf Þ ¼ fmax, then
Eðf jsÞ ¼ Eðf Þ ¼ fmax:(2) If the likelihood function Pðsj#Þ is strictly positive in each point in which f reaches its minimum value fmin, is continuous in an
arbitrary small neighborhood of those points, andM0 is such that a priori Eðf Þ ¼ fmin, then
Eðf jsÞ ¼ Eðf Þ ¼ fmin:Corollary 3. Consider a near-ignorance set of priorsM0. Let s be given and let Pðsj#Þ be a continuous strictly positive function on
H. IfM0 is such that Eðf Þ ¼ fmin and Eðf Þ ¼ fmax, thenEðf jsÞ ¼ Eðf Þ ¼ fmin;
Eðf jsÞ ¼ Eðf Þ ¼ fmax:In other words, given s, if the likelihood function is strictly positive, then the functions f that, according toM0, have vacuous expec-
tations a priori, have vacuous expectations also a posteriori, after having observed s. It follows that, if this sufﬁcient condition is
satisﬁed, we cannot use near-ignorance priors to model a state of prior ignorance because only vacuous posterior expectations
are produced. The sufﬁcient condition described above is met very easily in practice, as shown in the following two examples. In
the ﬁrst example, we consider a very simple setting where the manifest variables are categorical. In the second example, wedenote usually by P a probability (discrete case) and with p a probability density (continuous case). If an expression holds in both the discrete and the
ous case, like for example Eq. (3), then we use P to indicate both cases.
proof of this theorem is given in the appendix, together with all the other proofs of the paper.
he appendix it is shown that the assumptions of positivity of Pðsj#Þ in Theorem 2 can be substituted by the following weaker assumptions. For a given
y small d > 0, denote by Hd the measurable set, Hd :¼ f# 2 Hjf ð#ÞP fmax  dg: If Pðsj#Þ is such that, limd!0inf#2HdPðsj#Þ ¼ c > 0; then Statement 1 of
2 holds. The same holds for the second statement, substituting Hd with eHd :¼ f# 2 Hjf ð#Þ 6 fmin þ dg:
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therefore we are unable to learn under prior near-ignorance.
Example 4. Consider the medical test introduced in Example 1 and an (ideally) inﬁnite population of individuals. Denote by
the binary variable Xi 2 fH; Ig the health status of the ith individual of the population and with Si 2 fþ;g the results of the
diagnostic test applied to the same individual. We assume that the variables in the sequence ðXiÞi2N are IID with unknown
chances ð#;1 #Þ, where # corresponds to the (unknown) proportion of diseased individuals in the population. Denote by
1 e1 the speciﬁcity and with 1 e2 the sensitivity of the test. Then it holds that12 For
and BerPðSi ¼ þjXi ¼ HÞ ¼ e1 > 0; PðSi ¼ jXi ¼ IÞ ¼ e2 > 0;
where (I;H;þ;) denote (patient ill, patient healthy, test positive, test negative).
Suppose that we observe the results of the test applied to n different individuals of the population; using our previous
notation we have S ¼ s. For each individual we have,PðSi ¼ þj#Þ ¼ PðSi ¼ þjXi ¼ IÞPðXi ¼ Ij#Þ þ PðSi ¼ þjXi ¼ HÞPðXi ¼ Hj#Þ ¼ ð1 e2Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
>0
#þ e1|{z}
>0
ð1 #Þ > 0:Analogously,PðSi ¼ j#Þ ¼ PðSi ¼ jXi ¼ IÞPðXi ¼ Ij#Þ þ PðSi ¼ jXi ¼ HÞPðXi ¼ Hj#Þ ¼ e2|{z}
>0
#þ ð1 e1Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
>0
ð1 #Þ > 0:Denote by ns the number of positive tests in the observed sample s. Since the variables Si are independent, we havePðS ¼ sj#Þ ¼ ðð1 e2Þ  #þ e1  ð1 #ÞÞn
s  ðe2  #þ ð1 e1Þ  ð1 #ÞÞnn
s
> 0for each # 2 ½0;1 and each s 2 Xn. Therefore, according to Corollary 3, all the functions f that, according toM0, have vacuous
expectations a priori have vacuous expectations also a posteriori. It follows that, if we want to avoid vacuous posterior
expectations, then we cannot model our prior knowledge (ignorance) using a near-ignorance set of priors. This simple exam-
ple shows that our previous theoretical results raise serious questions about the use of near-ignorance sets of priors also in
very simple, common, and important situations. 
Example 4 focuses on categorical latent and manifest variables. In the next example, we show that our theoretical results
have important implications also in models with categorical latent variables and continuous manifest variables.
Example 5. Consider a sequence of IID categorical variables ðXiÞi2N with outcomes in Xn and unknown chances h 2 H.
Suppose that, for each iP 1, after a realization of the latent variable Xi, we can observe a realization of a continuous manifest
variable Si. Assume that pðSijXi ¼ xjÞ is a continuous positive probability density, e.g., a normal Nðlj;r2j Þ density, for each
xj 2 X. We havepðSij#Þ ¼
X
xj2X
pðSijXi ¼ xjÞ  PðXi ¼ xjj#Þ ¼
X
xj2X
pðSijXi ¼ xjÞ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
>0
#j > 0;because #j is positive for at least one j 2 f1; . . . ; kg and we have assumed Si to be independent of h given Xi. Because we have
assumed ðSiÞi2N to be a sequence of independent variables, we havepðS ¼ sj#Þ ¼
Yn
i¼1
pðSi ¼ sij#Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
>0
> 0:Therefore, according to Corollary 3, if we model our prior knowledge using a near-ignorance set of priorsM0, the vacuous
prior expectations implied byM0 remain vacuous a posteriori. It follows that, if we want to avoid vacuous posterior expec-
tations, we cannot model our prior knowledge using a near-ignorance set of priors. 
Examples 4 and 5 raise, in general, serious criticisms about the use of near-ignorance sets of priors in real applications.
4.2. An important special case: predictive probabilities
We focus now on a very important special case: that of predictive inference.12 Suppose that our aim is to predict the out-
comes of the next n0 variables Xnþ1; . . . ;Xnþn0 . Let X
0 :¼ ðXnþ1; . . . ;Xnþn0 Þ. If no confusion is possible, we denote X0 ¼ x0 by x0. Given
x0 2 Xn0 , our aim is to calculate Pðx0jsÞ and Pðx0jsÞ. Modeling our prior ignorance about the parameters h with a near-ignorance
set of priorsM0 and denoting by n0 :¼ ðn01; . . . ;n0kÞ the frequencies of the dataset x0, we havea general presentation of predictive inference see Geisser [4]; for a discussion of the imprecise probability approach to predictive inference see Walley
nard [13].
13 The
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p2M0
Ppðx0jsÞ ¼ inf
p2M0
Z
H
Yk
i¼1
#
ni 0
i pð#jsÞd# ¼ infp2M0 Ep
Yk
i¼1
#
n0
i
i js
 !
¼ E
Yk
i¼1
#
n0
i
i js
 !
; ð4Þwhere, according to Bayes’ rule,pð#jsÞ ¼ Pðsj#Þpð#ÞR
H Pðsj#Þpð#Þd#
;provided that
R
H Pðsj#Þpð#Þd#–0. Analogously, substituting sup to inf in (4), we obtainPðx0jsÞ ¼ E
Yk
i¼1
#
n0
i
i js
 !
: ð5ÞTherefore, the lower and upper probabilities assigned to the dataset x0 a priori (a posteriori) correspond to the prior (poster-
ior) lower and upper expectations of the continuous bounded function f ð#Þ ¼Qki¼1#n0ii .
It is easy to show that, in this case, the minimum of f is 0 and is reached in all the points # 2 Hwith #i ¼ 0 for some i such
that n0i > 0, while the maximum of f is reached in a single point of H corresponding to the relative frequencies f
0 of the sam-
ple x0, i.e., at f 0 ¼ n01n0 ; . . . ;
n0
k
n0
 
2 H, and the maximum of f is given byQki¼1 n0in0 n0i . It follows that the maximally imprecise prob-
abilities regarding the dataset x0, given that x0 has been generated by a multinomial process, are given byPðx0Þ ¼ E
Yk
i¼1
h
n0
i
i
 !
¼ 0; Pðx0Þ ¼ E
Yk
i¼1
h
n0
i
i
 !
¼
Yk
i¼1
n0i
n0
 n0
i
:The general results stated in Section 4.1 hold also in the particular case of predictive probabilities. In particular, Corollary 3
can be rewritten as follows.
Corollary 6. Consider a near-ignorance set of priorsM0. Let s be given and let Pðsj#Þ be a continuous strictly positive function on
H. Then, ifM0 implies prior probabilities for a dataset x0 2 Xn0 that are maximally imprecise, the predictive probabilities of x0 are
maximally imprecise also a posteriori, after having observed s, i.e.,Pðx0jsÞ ¼ Pðx0Þ ¼ 0; Pðx0jsÞ ¼ Pðx0Þ ¼
Yk
i¼1
n0i
n0
 n0
i
:4.3. Predicting the next outcome with categorical manifest variables
In this section we consider a special case for which we give necessary and sufﬁcient conditions to learn under prior near-
ignorance. These conditions are then used to analyze the IDM.
We assume that all the manifest variables in S are categorical. Given an arbitrary categorical manifest variable Si, denote
by Si :¼ fs1; . . . ; snig the ﬁnite set of possible outcomes of Si. The probabilities of Si are deﬁned conditional on the realized
value of Xi and are given bykhjðSiÞ :¼ PðSi ¼ shjXi ¼ xjÞ;
where h 2 f1; . . . ;nig and j 2 f1; . . . ; kg. The probabilities of Si can be collected in a ni  k stochastic matrix KSi deﬁned byKðSiÞ :¼
k11ðSiÞ . . . k1kðSiÞ
..
. . .
. ..
.
kni1ðSiÞ . . . knikðSiÞ
0BB@
1CCA;which is called emission matrix of Si.
Our aim, given s, is to predict the next (latent) outcome starting from prior near-ignorance. In other words, our aim is to
calculate PðXnþ1 ¼ xjjsÞ and PðXnþ1 ¼ xjjsÞ for each xj 2 X, using a set of priors M0 such that PðXnþ1 ¼ xjÞ ¼ 0 and
PðXnþ1 ¼ xjÞ ¼ 1 for each xj 2 X.
A possible near-ignorance set of priors for this problem is the setM0 used in the IDM. We have seen, in Section 3, that this
particular near-ignorance set of priors is such that PðXnþ1 ¼ xjÞ ¼ 0 and PðXnþ1 ¼ xjÞ ¼ 1 for each xj 2 X. For this particular
choice, the following theorem13 states necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for learning.
Theorem 7. Let KðSiÞ be the emission matrix of Si for i ¼ 1; . . . ;n. Let M0 be the near-ignorance set of priors used in the IDM.
Given an arbitrary observed dataset s, we obtain a posteriori the following inferences.
1. If all the elements of matrices KðSiÞ are nonzero, then, PðXnþ1 ¼ xjjsÞ ¼ 1, PðXnþ1 ¼ xjjsÞ ¼ 0, for every xj 2 X.
2. PðXnþ1 ¼ xjjsÞ < 1 for some xj 2 X, iff we observed at least one manifest variable Si ¼ sh such that khjðSiÞ ¼ 0.orem 7 is a slightly extended version of Theorem 1 in Piatti et al. [9].
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each r–j in f1; . . . ; kg.
In other words, to avoid vacuous posterior predictive probabilities for the next outcome, we need at least a partial perfection of the
observational process. Some simple criteria to recognize settings producing vacuous inferences are the following.
Corollary 8. Under the assumptions of Theorem 7, the following criteria hold:
1. If the j-th columns of matrices KðSiÞ have all nonzero elements, then, for each s, PðXnþ1 ¼ xjjsÞ ¼ 1.
2. If the j-th rows of matrices KðSiÞ have more than one nonzero element, then, for each s, PðXnþ1 ¼ xjjsÞ ¼ 0.
Example 9. Consider again the medical test of Example 4. The manifest variable Si (the result of the medical test applied to
the ith individual) is a binary variable with outcomes positive (+) or negative (). The underlying latent variable Xi (the health
status of the ith individual) is also a binary variable, with outcomes ill (I) or healthy (H). The emission matrix in this case is
the same for each i 2 N and is the 2 2 matrix,K ¼ 1 e2 e1
e2 1 e1
 
:All the elements of K are different from zero. Therefore, using as set of priors the near-ignorance set of priorsM0 of the IDM,
according to Theorem 7, we are unable to move away from the initial state of ignorance. This result conﬁrms, in the case of
the near-ignorance set of priors of the IDM, the general result of Example 4.
It is interesting to remark that it is impossible to learn for arbitrarily small values of e1 and e2, provided that they are
positive. It follows that there are situations where the observational process cannot be neglected, even when we deem it to
be imperfect with tiny probability. This point is particularly interesting when compared to what would be obtained using a
model with a single non-informative prior. In this case, the difference between a model with perfect observations and a
model that takes into account the probability or error would be very small and therefore the former model would be used
instead of the latter. Our results show that this procedure, that is almost an automatism when using models with a single
prior, may not be justiﬁed in models with sets of priors. The point here seems to be that the amount of imperfection of the
observational process should not be evaluated in absolute terms; it should rather be evaluated in comparison with the
weakness of the prior beliefs. 
The previous example has been concerned with the case in which the IDM is applied to a latent categorical variable. Now
we focus on the original setup for which the IDM was conceived, where there are no latent variables. In this case, it is well
known that the IDM leads to non-vacuous posterior predictive probabilities for the next outcome. In the next example, we
show how such a setup makes the IDM avoid the theoretical limitations stated in Section 4.1.
Example 10. In the IDM, we assume that the IID categorical variables ðXiÞi2N are observable. In other words, we have Si ¼ Xi
for each iP 1 and therefore the IDM is not a latent variable model. The IDM is equivalent to a model with categorical
manifest variables and emission matrices equal to the identity matrix I. Therefore, according to the second and third
statements of Theorem 7, if x contains only observations of the type xj, thenPðXnþ1 ¼ xjjxÞ > 0; PðXnþ1 ¼ xjjxÞ ¼ 1;
PðXnþ1 ¼ xhjxÞ ¼ 0; PðXnþ1 ¼ xhjxÞ < 1;for each h–j. Otherwise, for all the other possible observed dataset x,PðXnþ1 ¼ xjjxÞ > 0; PðXnþ1 ¼ xjjxÞ < 1;
for each j 2 f1; . . . ; kg. It follows that, in general, the IDM produces, for each observed dataset x, non-vacuous posterior pre-
dictive probabilities for the next outcome.
The IDM avoids the theoretical limitations highlighted in Section 4.1 thanks to its particular likelihood function. Having
observed S ¼ X ¼ x, we havePðS ¼ xj#Þ ¼ PðX ¼ xj#Þ ¼
Yk
i¼1
#
ni
i ;where ni denotes the number of times that xi 2 X has been observed in x. We have PðX ¼ xj#Þ ¼ 0 for all # such that #j ¼ 0
for at least one j such that nj > 0 and PðX ¼ xj#Þ > 0 for all the other # 2 H, in particular for all # in the interior of H.
Consider, to make things simpler, that in x at least two different outcomes have been observed. The posterior predictive
probabilities for the next outcome are obtained calculating the lower and upper expectations of the function f ð#Þ ¼ #j for all
j 2 f1; . . . ; kg: This function reaches its minimum (fmin ¼ 0) if #j ¼ 0 and its maximum (fmin ¼ 1) if #j ¼ 1. Therefore, the
points where the function f ð#Þ ¼ #j reaches its minimum, resp. its maximum, are on the boundary ofH and it is easy to show
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are not met. 
Example 10 shows that we are able to learn, using a near-ignorance set of priors, only if the likelihood function Pðsj#Þ is
equal to zero in some critical points. The likelihood function of the IDM is very peculiar, being in general equal to zero on
some parts of the boundary of H, and allows therefore to use a near-ignorance set of priorsM0 that models in a satisfactory
way a condition of prior (near-) ignorance.14
Yet, since the variables ðXiÞi2N are assumed to be observable, the successful application of a near-ignorance set of priors in
the IDM is not helpful in addressing the doubts raised by our theoretical results about the applicability of near-ignorance set
of priors in situations, where the variables ðXiÞi2N are latent, as shown in Example 9.
5. On modeling observable quantities
In this section, we discuss three alternative approaches that, at a ﬁrst sight, might seem promising to overcome the prob-
lem of learning under prior near-ignorance. For the sake of simplicity, we consider the particular problem of calculating pre-
dictive probabilities for the next outcome and a very simple setting based on the IDM. The alternative approaches are based
on trying to predict the manifest variable rather than the latent one, thus changing perspective with respect to the previous
sections. This change of perspective is useful to consider also because on some occasions, e.g., when the imperfection of the
observational process is considered to be low, one may deem sufﬁcient to focus on predicting the manifest variable. We
show, however, that the proposed approaches eventually do not solve the mentioned learning question, which remains
therefore an open problem.
Let us introduce in detail the simple setting we are going to use. Consider a sequence of independent and identically dis-
tributed categorical binary latent variables ðXiÞi2N with unknown chances h ¼ ðh1; h2Þ ¼ ðh1;1 h1Þ, and a sequence of IID bin-
ary manifest variables ðSiÞi2N with the same possible outcomes. Since the manifest variables are also IID, then they can be
regarded as the product of an overall multinomial data-generating process (that includes the generation of the latent vari-
ables as well as the observational process) with unknown chances n :¼ ðn1; n2Þ ¼ ðn1;1 n1Þ. Suppose that the emission ma-
trix K is known, constant for each i and strictly diagonally dominant, i.e.,14 SeeK ¼ 1 e2 e1
e2 1 e1
 
;with e1; e2–0, e1 < 0:5 and e2 < 0:5. This simple matrix models the case in which, for each i, we are observing the outcomes
of the random variable Xi but there is a positive probability of confounding the actual outcome of Xi with the other one. The
random variable Si represents our observation, while Xi represents the true value. A typical example for this kind of situation
is the medical example discussed in Examples 4 and 9. Suppose that we have observed S ¼ s and our aim is to calculate
PðXnþ1 ¼ x1jsÞ and PðXnþ1 ¼ x1jsÞ.
In the previous sections we have dealt with this problem by modeling our ignorance about the chances of Xnþ1 with a
near-ignorance set of priors and then calculating PðXnþ1 ¼ x1jsÞ and PðXnþ1 ¼ x1jsÞ. But we already know from Example 4 that
in this case we obtain vacuous predictive probabilities, i.e.,PðXnþ1 ¼ x1jsÞ ¼ 0; PðXnþ1 ¼ x1jsÞ ¼ 1:
Because this approach does not produce any useful result, one could be tempted to modify it in order to obtain non-vacuous
predictive probabilities for the next outcome. We have identiﬁed three possible alternative approaches that we discuss be-
low. The basic structure of the three approaches is identical and is based on the idea of focusing on the manifest variables,
that are observable, instead of the latent variables. The proposed structure is the following:
 specify a near-ignorance set of priors for the chances n of Snþ1;
 construct predictive probabilities for the manifest variables, i.e.,PðSnþ1 ¼ x1jsÞ; PðSnþ1 ¼ x1jsÞ;
 use the predictive probabilities calculated in the previous point to say something about the predictive probabilitiesPðXnþ1 ¼ x1jsÞ; PðXnþ1 ¼ x1jsÞ:
The three approaches differ in the speciﬁcation of the near-ignorance set of priors for n and on the way PðSnþ1 ¼ x1jsÞ and
PðSnþ1 ¼ x1jsÞ are used to reconstruct PðXnþ1 ¼ x1jsÞ and PðXnþ1 ¼ x1jsÞ.
The ﬁrst approach consists in specifying a near-ignorance set of priors for the chances n taking into consideration the fact
that these chances are related to the chances h through the equationn1 ¼ ð1 e2Þ  h1 þ e1  ð1 h1Þ;Walley [12] and Bernard [1] for an in-depth discussion on the properties of the IDM.
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sider the near-ignorance set of priorsM0 of the IDM on h, consisting of standard bðs; tÞ distributions, and to substitute15 Seeh1 ¼ n1  e11 ðe1 þ e2Þ ; dh1 ¼
dn1
1 ðe1 þ e2Þ ;into all the prior distributions in M0. We obtain thus a near-ignorance set of priors for n consisting of beta distributions
scaled on the set ½e1;1 e2, i.e.,n1 
C
1 ðe1 þ e2Þ
n1  e1
1 ðe1 þ e2Þ
 st11 ð1 n1Þ  e2
1 ðe1 þ e2Þ
 st21
;where C :¼ CðsÞCðst1ÞCðst2Þ. But, scaling the distributions, we incur the same problem we have incurred with the IDM for the latent
variable. Suppose that we have observed a dataset s containing n1 times the outcome x1 and n n1 times the outcome x2. The
likelihood function in this case is given by Lðn1; n2Þ ¼ nn11  ð1 n1Þðnn1Þ. Because n1 2 ½e1;1 e2 the likelihood functions is al-
ways positive and therefore the extreme distributions that are present in the near-ignorance set of priors for n produce vac-
uous expectations for n1, i.e., Eðn1jsÞ ¼ 1 e2 and Eðn1jsÞ ¼ e1. It follows that this approach does not solve our theoretical
problem. Moreover, it follows that the inability to learn is present under near-ignorance even when we focus on predicting
the manifest variable!
The second, more naive, approach consists in using the near-ignorance set of priorsM0 used in the standard IDM to model
ignorance about n. In this way we are assuming (wrongly) that n1 2 ½0;1, ignoring thus the fact that n1 2 ½e1;1 e2 and
therefore implicitly ignoring the emission matrix K. Applying the standard IDM on n we are able to produce non-vacuous
probabilities PðSnþ1 ¼ x1jsÞ and PðSnþ1 ¼ x1jsÞ. Now, because K is known, knowing the value of PðSnþ1 ¼ x1jsÞ it is possible
to reconstruct PðXnþ1 ¼ x1jsÞ. But this approach, that on one hand ignores K and on the other hand takes it into consideration,
is clearly wrong. For example, it can be easily shown that it can produce probabilities outside ½0;1.
Finally, a third possible approach could be to neglect the existence of the latent level and consider Snþ1 to be the variable
of interest. Applying the standard IDM on the manifest variables we are clearly able to produce non-vacuous probabilities
PðSnþ1 ¼ x1jsÞ and PðSnþ1 ¼ x1jsÞ that are then simply used instead of the probabilities PðXnþ1 ¼ x1jsÞ and PðXnþ1 ¼ x1jsÞ in
the problem of interest. This approach is the one typically followed by those who apply the IDM in practical problems.15 This
approach requires the user to assume perfect observability; an assumption that appears to be incorrect in most (if not all) real
statistical problems. And yet this procedure, despite being wrong or hardly justiﬁable from a theoretical point of view, has pro-
duced in several applications of the IDM useful results, at least from an empirical point of view. This paradox between our the-
oretical results and the current practice is an open problem that deserves to be investigated in further research.6. Conclusions
In this paper we have proved a sufﬁcient condition that prevents learning about a latent categorical variable to take place
under prior near-ignorance regarding the data-generating process.
The condition holds as soon as the likelihood is strictly positive (and continuous), and so is satisﬁed frequently, even in
the more common and simple settings. Taking into account that the considered framework is very general and pervasive of
statistical practice, we regard this result as a form of strong evidence against the possibility to use prior near-ignorance in
real statistical problems. Given also that prior near-ignorance is arguably a privileged way to model a state of ignorance, our
results appear to substantially reduce the hope to be able to adopt a form of prior ignorance to do objective-minded statis-
tical inference.
With respect to future research, two possible research directions seem to be particularly important to investigate.
As reported by Bernard [1], near-ignorance sets of priors, in the speciﬁc form of the IDM, have been successfully used in a
number of applications. On the other hand, the theoretical results presented in this paper point to the impossibility of learn-
ing in real statistical problems when starting from a state of near-ignorance. This paradox between empirical and theoretical
results should be investigated in order to better understand the practical relevance of the theoretical analysis presented here,
and more generally to explain the mechanism behind such an apparent contradiction.
The proofs contained in this paper suggest that the impossibility of learning under prior near-ignorance with latent vari-
ables is mainly due to the presence, in the set of priors, of extreme distributions arbitrarily close to the deterministic ones.
Some preliminary experimental analyses have shown that learning is possible as soon as one restricts the set of priors so as
to rule out the extreme distributions. This can be realized by deﬁning a notion of distance between priors and then by allow-
ing a distribution to enter the prior set of probability distributions only if it is at least a certain positive distance away from
the deterministic priors. The minimal distance can be chosen arbitrarily small (while remaining positive), and this allows one
to model a state of very weak beliefs, close to near-ignorance. Such a weak state of beliefs could keep some of the advantages
of near-ignorance (although it would clearly not be a model of ignorance) while permitting learning to take place. The main
problem of this approach is the justiﬁcation, i.e., the interpretation of the (arbitrary) restriction of the near-ignorance set ofBernard [1] for a list of applications of the IDM.
A. Piatti et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 50 (2009) 597–611 607priors. A way to address this issue might be to identify a set of desirable principles, possibly similar to the symmetry and
embedding principles, leading in a natural way to a suitably large set of priors describing a state close to near-ignorance.
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the Hasler foundation Grant 2233.Appendix A. Technical preliminaries
In this appendix we prove some technical results that are used to prove the theorems in the paper. First of all, we intro-
duce some notation used in this appendix. Consider a sequence of probability densities ðpnÞn2N and a function f deﬁned on a
set H. Then we use the notationEnðf Þ :¼
Z
H
f ð#Þpnð#Þd#; Pnð eHÞ :¼ ZeH pnð#Þd#; eH#H;and with ! we denote limn!1.
Theorem 11. Let H  Rk be the closed k-dimensional simplex and let ðpnÞn2N be a sequence of probability densities deﬁned on H
w.r.t. the Lebesgue measure. Let f P 0 be a bounded continuous function onH and let fmax :¼ supHðf Þ and fmin :¼ infHðf Þ. For this
function deﬁne the measurable setsHd ¼ f# 2 Hjf ð#ÞP fmax  dg; ðA:1ÞeHd ¼ f# 2 Hjf ð#Þ 6 fmin þ dg: ðA:2Þ
(1) Assume that ðpnÞn2N concentrates on a maximum of f for n !1, in the sense thatEnðf Þ ! fmax; ðA:3Þ
then, for all d > 0, it holdsPnðHdÞ ! 1:
(2) Assume that ðpnÞn2N concentrates on a minimum of f for n !1, in the sense thatEnðf Þ ! fmin; ðA:4Þ
then, for all d > 0, it holdsPnð eHdÞ ! 1:
Proof. We begin by proving the ﬁrst statement. Let d > 0 be arbitrary and Hd :¼ H nHd. From (A.1) we know that on Hd it
holds f ð#ÞP fmax  d, and therefore on Hd we have f ð#Þ 6 fmax  d, and thusfmax  f ð#Þ
d
P 1: ðA:5ÞIt follows that1 PnðHdÞ ¼ PnðHdÞ ¼
Z
Hd
pnð#Þd# 6
ðA:5Þ Z
Hd
fmax  f ð#Þ
d
pnð#Þd# 6
Z
H
fmax  f ð#Þ
d
pnð#Þd# ¼
1
d
ðfmax  Enðf ÞÞ !ðA:3Þ0;and therefore PnðHdÞ ! 1 and thus the ﬁrst statement is proved. To prove the second statement, let d > 0 be arbitrary andbHd :¼ H n eHd. From (A.2) we know that on eHd it holds f ð#Þ 6 fmin þ d, and therefore on bHd we have f ð#ÞP fmin þ d, and thus
f ð#Þ  fmin
d
P 1: ðA:6ÞIt follows that1 Pnð eHdÞ ¼ Pnð bHdÞ ¼ ZbHd pnð#Þd# 6
ðA:6Þ ZbHd f ð#Þ  fmind pnð#Þd# 6
Z
H
f ð#Þ  fmin
d
pnð#Þd# ¼
1
d
ðEnðf Þ  fminÞ !ðA:3Þ0;and therefore Pnð eHdÞ ! 1. h
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following two statements hold.
(1) If the function Lð#Þ is such thatc :¼ lim
d!0
inf
#2Hd
Lð#Þ > 0; ðA:7Þand ðpnÞn2N concentrates on a maximum of f for n !1, thenEnðLf Þ
EnðLÞ ¼
R
H f ð#ÞLð#Þpnð#Þd#R
H Lð#Þpnð#Þd#
! fmax: ðA:8Þ(2) If the function Lð#Þ is such thatc :¼ lim
d!0
inf
#2eHd Lð#Þ > 0; ðA:9Þand ðpnÞn2N concentrates on a minimum of f for n !1, thenEnðLf Þ
EnðLÞ ! fmin: ðA:10ÞRemark 13. If L is strictly positive in each point inHwhere the function f reaches its maximum, resp. minimum, and is con-
tinuous in an arbitrary small neighborhood of those points, then (A.7), resp. (A.9), are satisﬁed.
Proof. We begin by proving the ﬁrst statement of the theorem. Fix e and d arbitrarily small, but d small enough such that
inf#2HdLð#ÞP c2. denote by Lmax the supremum of the function Lð#Þ in H. From Theorem 11, we know that PnðHdÞP 1 e,
for n sufﬁciently large. This implies, for n sufﬁciently large,EnðLÞ ¼
Z
H
Lð#Þpnð#Þd#P
Z
Hd
Lð#Þpnð#Þd#P
c
2
ð1 eÞ; ðA:11Þ
EnðLf Þ 6 EnðLfmaxÞ ¼ fmaxEnðLÞ; ðA:12Þ
EnðLÞ ¼
Z
Hd
Lð#Þpnð#Þd#þ
Z
Hd
Lð#Þpnð#Þd#
6 Lmax
Z
Hd
pnð#Þd#þ
Z
Hd
f ð#Þ
fmax  d|ﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
PonHd
Lð#Þpnð#Þd#
6 Lmax  eþ 1fmax  dEnðLf Þ: ðA:13ÞCombining (A.11), (A.12) and (A.13), we havefmax P
EnðLf Þ
EnðLÞ P ðfmax  dÞ
EnðLÞ  Lmax  e
EnðLÞ P ðfmax  dÞ 1
Lmax  e
c
2 ð1 eÞ
 
:Since the right-hand side of the last inequality tends to fmax for d; e! 0, and both d; e can be chosen arbitrarily small, we haveEnðLf Þ
EnðLÞ ! fmax:To prove the second statement of the theorem, ﬁx e and d arbitrarily small, but d small enough such that inf
#2eHdLð#ÞP c2.From Theorem 11, we know that Pnð eHdÞP 1 e, for n sufﬁciently large and therefore Pnð bHdÞ 6 e. This implies, for n sufﬁ-
ciently large,EnðLÞ ¼
Z
H
Lð#Þpnð#Þd#P
Z
eHd Lð#Þpnð#Þd#P c2 ð1 eÞ; ðA:14Þ
EnðLf ÞP EnðLfminÞ ¼ fminEnðLÞ ) fmin 6 EnðLf ÞEnðLÞ : ðA:15ÞDeﬁne the functionKð#Þ :¼ 1 f ð#Þ
fmin þ d
 
Lð#Þ:
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EnðLÞ ¼
Z
bHd Lð#Þpnð#Þd#þ
Z
eHd Lð#Þpnð#Þd#
P
Z
bHd Lð#Þpnð#Þd#þ
Z
eHd f ð#Þfmin þ d|ﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
61 on eHd
Lð#Þpnð#Þd#
¼
Z
bHd Lð#Þ  f ð#Þfmin þ d Lð#Þ
 
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
¼Kð#Þ
pnð#Þd#þ
1
fmin þ d
Z
H
f ð#ÞLð#Þpnð#Þd#|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
¼EnðLf Þ
P Kmin  Pnð bHdÞ þ 1fmin þ d  EnðLf Þ:
It follows thatðEnðLÞ  Kmin  Pnð bHdÞÞðfmin þ dÞP EnðLf Þ;
and thus, combining the last inequality with (A.14) and (A.15), we obtainfmin 6
EnðLf Þ
EnðLÞ 6 ðfmin þ dÞ 1þ
jKminj  Pnð bHdÞ
EnðLÞ
 !
6 ðfmin þ dÞ 1þ jKminj  ec
2 ð1 eÞ
 
:Since the right-hand side of the last inequality tends to fmin for d; e! 0, and both d; e can be chosen arbitrarily small, we
haveEnðLf Þ
EnðLÞ ! fmin: Appendix B. Proofs of the main results
Proof of the Theorem 2. Deﬁne, fmin :¼ inf#2Hf ð#Þ, fmax :¼ sup f ð#Þ; and deﬁne the bounded non-negative function#2H
~f ð#Þ :¼ f ð#Þ  fmin P 0. We have, ~fmax ¼ fmax  fmin. IfM0 is such that a priori, Eðf Þ ¼ fmax, then we have also that Eð~f Þ ¼ ~fmax,
because,Eð~f Þ ¼ sup
p2M0
Epðf  fminÞ ¼ sup
p2M0
Epðf Þ  fmin ¼ Eðf Þ  fmin ¼ fmax  fmin ¼ ~fmax:Then, it is possible to deﬁne a sequence ðpnÞn2N M0 such that Enð~f Þ ! ~fmax. According to Theorem 12, substituting Lð#Þwith
Pðsj#Þ in (A.8), we see that Enð~f jsÞ ! ~fmax ¼ Eð~f Þ and therefore Eð~f jsÞ ¼ Eð~f Þ, from which follows that,Eðf jsÞ  fmin ¼ Eðf Þ  fmin ¼ fmax  fmin:
We can conclude that, Eðf jsÞ ¼ Eðf Þ ¼ fmax: In the same way, substituting E to E, we can prove that Eðf jsÞ ¼ Eðf Þ ¼ fmin: h
Corollary 3 is a direct consequence of Theorem 2.
Proof of the Theorem 7. To prove Theorem 7 we need the following lemma.
Lemma 14.
Consider a dataset x with frequencies a ¼ ax1; . . . ; axk
 
. Then, the following equality holds,Yk
h¼1
#
ax
h
h  dirs;tð#Þ ¼
Qk
h¼1 
Qax
h
j¼1ðsth þ j 1ÞQn
j¼1ðsþ j 1Þ
 dirsx ;txð#Þ;where sx :¼ nþ s and txh :¼
ax
h
þsth
nþs . When a
x
h ¼ 0, we set
Q0
j¼1ðsth þ j 1Þ :¼ 1 by deﬁnition.
A proof of Lemma 14 is in [9]. Because Pðxj#Þ ¼ Qkh¼1#axhh , according to Bayes’ rule, we have pð#jxÞ ¼ dirsx ;tx ð#Þ andQk
h¼1
Qax
h
l¼1ðsth þ l 1ÞPðxÞ ¼ Qn
l¼1ðsþ l 1Þ
: ðB:1ÞGiven a Dirichlet distribution dirs;tð#Þ, the expected value Eð#jÞ is given by Eð#jÞ ¼ tj (see [7]). It follows thatEð#jjxÞ ¼ txj ¼
axj þ stj
nþ s :
610 A. Piatti et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 50 (2009) 597–611We are now ready to prove Theorem 7.
1. The ﬁrst statement of Theorem 7 is a consequence of Corollary 6. Because Si is independent of # given Xi for each i 2 N, we
havePðsjx;#Þ ¼ PðsjxÞ; ðB:2Þ
and therefore, using (B.2) and Bayes’ rule, we obtain the likelihood function,Lð#Þ ¼ Pðsj#Þ ¼
X
x2Xn
PðsjxÞ  Pðxj#Þ ¼
X
x2Xn
PðsjxÞ 
Yk
h¼1
#
ax
h
h : ðB:3ÞBecause all the elements of the matrices KSi are nonzero, we have PðsjxÞ > 0, for each s and each x 2 Xn. For each # 2 H,
there is at least one x 2 Xn such that Qkh¼1#axhh > 0. It follows that,Lð#Þ ¼
X
x2Xn
PðsjxÞ 
Yk
j¼1
#
ax
j
j > 0;for each # 2 H and therefore, according to Corollary 6 with n0 ¼ 1, the predictive probabilities that are vacuous a priori
remain vacuous also a posteriori.
2. We have PðXnþ1 ¼ xjjsÞ ¼ Eð#jjsÞ, and therefore, according to Lemma 14 and Bayes’ rule,PðXnþ1 ¼ xjjsÞ ¼
R
H #jPðsj#Þpð#Þd#R
H Pðsj#Þpð#Þd#
¼ðB:2Þ
P
x2Xn
R
H #jPðsjxÞPðxj#Þpð#Þd#P
x2Xn
R
H PðsjxÞPðxj#Þpð#Þd#
¼
P
x2XnPðsjxÞPðxÞ
R
H #jpð#jxÞd#P
x2XnPðsjxÞPðxÞ
¼
X
x2Xn
PðsjxÞPðxÞP
x2XnPðsjxÞPðxÞ
 
 Eð#jjxÞ;
¼
X
x2Xn
PðsjxÞPðxÞP
x2XnPðsjxÞPðxÞ
 
 a
x
j þ stj
nþ s : ðB:4Þ5It can be checked that the denominator of (B.4) is positive and therefore conditioning on events with zero probability is
not a problem in this setting. (B.4) is a convex sum of fractions and is therefore a continuous function of t onT. Denote by
xj the dataset of length n composed only by outcomes xj, i.e., the dataset with ax
j
j ¼ n and ax
j
h ¼ 0 for each h–j. For all x–xj
we haveaxj þ stj
nþ s 6
n 1þ stj
nþ s 6
n 1þ s
nþ s < 1;
on T (the closure of T), only xj has
sup
t2T
ax
j
j þ stj
nþ s ¼ supt2T
nþ stj
nþ s ¼ 1:
A convex sum of fractions smaller than or equal to one is equal to one, only if the weights associated to fractions smaller
than one are all equal to zero and there are some positive weights associated to fractions equal to one. If PðsjxjÞ ¼ 0, then
(B.4) is a convex combination of fractions strictly smaller than 1 onT and therefore PðXnþ1 ¼ xjjsÞ < 1. If PðsjxjÞ–0, then
letting tj ! 1, and consequently th ! 0 for all h–j, according to (B.1), we have PðxjÞ ! 1 and PðxÞ ! 0 for all x–xj, and
thus, using (B.4),
1P PðXnþ1 ¼ xjjsÞP lim
tj!1
PðXnþ1 ¼ xjjsÞ ¼
PðsjxjÞPðxjÞ nþsnþs
PðsjxjÞPðxjÞ ¼ 1:
If we have observed a manifest variable Si ¼ sh with kSthj ¼ 0, it means that the observation excludes the possibility that the
underlying value of Xi is xj, therefore PðsjxjÞ ¼ 0 and thus
PðXnþ1 ¼ xjjsÞ < 1:
On the other hand, if PðXnþ1 ¼ xjjsÞ < 1, it must hold that PðsjxjÞ ¼ 0, i.e., that we have observed a realization of a manifest
that is incompatible with the underlying (latent) outcome xj. But a realization of a manifest that is incompatible with the
underlying (latent) outcome only if the observed manifest variable was Si ¼ sh with kSihj ¼ 0.
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underlying value of Xi is xj. Therefore, PðsjxÞ ¼ 0 for all x with axj ¼ 0. It follows from (B.4) thatPðXnþ1 ¼ xjjsÞ ¼
P
x2Xn ; ax
j
>0PðsjxÞPðxÞ 
ax
j
þstj
nþsP
x2Xn ; ax
j
>0PðsjxÞPðxÞ
;
which is a convex combination of terms
axj þ stj
nþ s P
axj
nþ sP
1
nþ s ;
and is therefore greater than zero for each t 2T. It follows that
PðXnþ1 ¼ xjjsÞP 1nþ s > 0:
On the other hand, if we do not observe a manifest variable as described above, it exists surely at least one x with axj ¼ 0
and PðsjxÞ > 0. In this case, using (B.4) and letting tj ! 0, we have, because of (B.1), that PðxÞ ! 0 for all x with axj > 0. It
follows that
lim
tj!0
PðX ¼ xjjsÞ ¼ lim
tj!0
P
x2Xn ; ax
j
¼0PðsjxÞPðxÞ 
ax
j
þstj
nþsP
x2Xn ; ax
j
¼0PðsjxÞPðxÞ
:
Assume for simplicity that, for all h–j, th90, then PðxÞ > 0 for all xwith axj ¼ 0 and PðxÞ90. Because, with axj ¼ 0, we have
lim
tj!0
axj þ stj
nþ s ¼ limtj!0
0þ sti
nþ s ¼ 0;
we obtain directly,
0 6 PðXnþ1 ¼ xjjsÞ ¼ inf
t2T
PðXnþ1 ¼ xjjsÞ 6 lim
tj!0
PðXnþ1 ¼ xjjsÞ ¼ 0: 
Corollary 8 is a direct consequence of Theorem 7.
References
[1] J.-M. Bernard, An introduction to the imprecise Dirichlet model for multinomial data, International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 39 (2–3) (2005)
123–150.
[2] D. Boorsbom, G.J. Mellenbergh, J. van Heerden, The theoretical status of latent variables, Psychological Review 110 (2) (2002) 203–219.
[3] G. De Cooman, E. Miranda, Symmetry of models versus models of symmetry, in: W. Hofer, G. Wheeler (Eds.), Probability and Inference: Essays in Honor
of Henry E. Kyburg Jr., King’s College Publications, London, 2006.
[4] S. Geisser, Predictive inference: an introduction, Monographs on Statistics and Applied Probability, Chapman and Hall, New York, 1993.
[5] M. Hutter, On the foundations of universal sequence prediction, in: Proceedings of Third Annual Conference on Theory and Applications of Models of
Computation (TAMC’06), LNCS, vol. 3959, Springer, 2006, pp. 408–420.
[6] R. Kass, L. Wassermann, The selection of prior distributions by formal rules, Journal of the American Statistical Association 91 (1996) 1343–1370.
[7] S. Kotz, N. Balakrishnan, N.L. Johnson, Continuous multivariate distributions, vol. 1: models and applications, Wiley Series in Probability and Statistics,
Wiley, New York, 2000.
[8] P.S. Laplace, Essai Philosophique sur les probabilites (1820), English Translation: Philosophical Essays on Probabilities, Dover, New York, 1951.
[9] A. Piatti, M. Zaffalon, F. Trojani, Limits of learning from imperfect observations under prior ignorance: the case of the imprecise Dirichlet model, in: F.G.
Cozman, R. Nau, T. Seidenfeld (Eds.), ISIPTA’05: Proceedings of the Fourth International Symposium on Imprecise Probabilities and Their Applications,
Manno, Switzerland, 2005, pp. 276–286. SIPTA.
[10] A. Skrondal, S. Rabe-Hasketh, Generalized latent variable modeling: multilevel, longitudinal, and structural equation models, Chapman and Hall/CRC,
Boca Raton, 2004.
[11] P. Walley, Statistical Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities, Chapman and Hall, New York, 1991.
[12] P. Walley, Inferences from multinomial data: learning about a bag of marbles, J.R. Statist. Soc. B 58 (1) (1996) 3–57.
[13] P. Walley, J-M. Bernard, Imprecise probabilistic prediction for categorical data. Tech. rep. caf-9901, Laboratoire Cognition et Activites Finalisees,
Universite Paris 8, Saint-Denis, France, 1999.
[14] I. Yang, M.P. Becker, Latent variable modeling of diagnostic accuracy, Biometrics 53 (1997) 948–958.
